DECLASSIFIED Pol 23-9 LIBYA

SECRET
Classification

Department of State

TELEGRAM

158075 E 172

XR PBL LIBYA-US

EXCISE

INDICATE:
☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

DISTRIBUTION

ACTION: Amembassy BEIRUT
Amembassy JIDDA
Amembassy RABAT

INFO: Amembassy LONDON
Amembassy PARIS
Amembassy TEHRAN
Amembassy TUNIS

DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/MR
REVIEWED BY W H DATE 7 JUL 1982
PORTIONS DENIED AS INDICATED

158075

STATE

Subject: Reaction to Libyan Coup

1. Libyan coup has understandably created concern in pro-Western moderate Arab states and questions have once more been raised regarding credibility of US "commitments" to friends. [redacted] B1 E D

[redacted]

2. USG has in various ways over past twenty years expressed its concern and interest in territorial integrity, stability

DRAFTED BY:	DRAFTING DATE	TEL. EXT.	APPROVED BY:
AF/N:JFKoot/AF:DDNewsom:jms	9/12/69	20455	U/Elliot Richardson [redacted]

CLEARANCES:

L - Mr. Salans

NEA - Mr. Davies

S/S - Mr. Cleysteen

[redacted]

AF - Ambassador Newsom

SECRET
Classification

FORM DS-322
4 - 68

DISTRIBUTION

ACTION: BEIRUT, JIDDA, RABAT; INFO LONDON, PARIS, TEHRAN, TUNIS

and independence countries whose policies generally oriented in our direction. In certain countries, further, US has had installations of importance to it whose presence has implied a US interest.

3. States can to certain extent share responsibility in matters of external threat to one of them, but internal security depends in last analysis on government in power. In some cases US has made specific commitment to consult in event of external aggression but nowhere in Arab world have we made specific commitment to commit forces, to support specific regimes or to intervene in internal disorders. Making of such commitments by the US raises Constitutional questions, number of which are currently under study by Congress.

4. We are concerned, naturally, for survival of friendly regimes and would have an interest therefore in how they deal with internal problems which may threaten their stability and progress. To some extent we can be of help to government that is helping itself to ward off such threats in timely

DRAFTED BY:	DRAFTING DATE	TEL. EXT.	APPROVED BY:

CLEARANCES:

DISTRIBUTION

ACTION: BEIRUT, JIDDA, RABAT; info LOND, PARIS, TEHRAN, TUNIS

and constructive fashion, but in last analysis stability and security of regime depends overwhelmingly on its own actions. US strongly believes viability greatest where regimes maintain enlightened, vigilant attention to basic national social and economic needs. US has endeavored, while not ignoring direct security requirements, to emphasize these other needs in relations with its friends. Where regimes, either through growing distance from people, inattention, or toleration of corruption, make themselves vulnerable to sudden change, there is little US can do to save them from their own weakness.

5. In specific case of Libya, [redacted] over last few years have emphasized both that US most unlikely to intervene in internal disorders and that US would have grave doubts regarding viability regime imposed or reimposed by outside military intervention.

DRAFTED BY:	DRAFTING DATE	TEL. EXT.	APPROVED BY:

CLEARANCES:

DISTRIBUTION

ACTION: BEIRUT, JIDDA, RABAT; info LONDON, PARIS, TEHRAN, TUNIS

6. Intervention to support or preserve specific regime unable to help itself is serious and unpopular matter in modern context and may raise international legal questions. [redacted] US experience further has suggested that even when foreign government might be sympathetic to intervention, internal political factors within its own borders might seriously limit support it is able to give in this regard.

7. One further factor needs emphasizing. In dynamics of modern politics, slogans and categories can be misleading. Full evaluation of nature each country's problems necessary before reaching conclusions on implications of political change. Too rapid an assumption regarding nature or support of political change can seriously affect ability of interested neighbors [redacted] to influence and determine full results and effects of such change. END

DRAFTED BY:	DRAFTING DATE	TEL. EXT.	APPROVED BY:

CLEARANCES:

ROGERS